Formative Causation

Formative causation is Rupert Sheldrake's term for causation by the repetition of form rather than by energetic mechanism. It is the broad causal claim within which Morphic Resonance and morphic-fields sit.

The source archive page devoted to Sheldrake presents the term in this general sense. The newly generated version, drawn from Sheldrake's Morphic Resonance: The Nature of Formative Causation (2009), states the hypothesis as: systems are organized as they are because similar systems were organized that way in the past. It is concerned with the repetition of forms, not their origin.

The claim

Under formative causation, the regularities of biology and chemistry are not fully explained by genetics, developmental mechanics, or known physics. Instead, the repetition of form is said to be the primary source of regularity: a system's form is shaped by the accumulated influence of past similar systems, transmitted through morphic fields by morphic resonance.

The claim is presented as general, applying to biological form, to behavior, and to the habits of physical systems such as crystals.

Non-energetic causation

Sheldrake introduces formative causation as a non-energetic type of causation, distinguished from energetic causation and illustrated by the architectural-plan analogy — a plan is information, not energy. He argues that physics explains change through energy but not the ordering of change, which depends on the spatial structure of fields. Field structures are described as "geometrical" or spatial causes, not themselves energy, illustrated by the contrast between Newton's attractive force and Einstein's curved space-time.

Relationship to the mechanistic theory, vitalism and organicism

The book lays out four positions on morphogenesis: the mechanistic theory, which asserts morphogenesis is entirely explicable in terms of physics; vitalism, exemplified by Hans Driesch's nonphysical entelechy; organicism, which replaces entelechy with morphogenetic fields, chreodes and attractors; and the problem of form itself, which Sheldrake argues is not captured by the conserved quantitative quantities of physics.

Sheldrake distinguishes a refutable version of the mechanistic theory (explanation by known laws only, which would be refuted by discovery of a new law of physics) from an irrefutable version (known and unknown laws, which "would include" organicism and vitalism). He argues that in practice the mechanistic theory "is not treated as a rigorously defined, refutable scientific theory; rather, it serves to provide a justification for the conservative method of working within the established framework of thought provided by existing physics and chemistry."

His pivotal move: "if morphogenetic fields are considered to be fully explicable in terms of known physical principles, they represent nothing but an ambiguous terminology superimposed upon a sophisticated version of the mechanistic theory. Only if they are assumed to play a causal role, at present unrecognized by physics, can a testable theory be developed."

The four difficulties with mechanistic morphogenesis

1. DNA and proteins are too similar across species to explain form.
2. Different patterns arise from the same DNA within one organism.
3. Even identified morphogens do not explain their own patterning.
4. The chain of one-to-one causal relationships ends at protein folding, cell aggregation and tissue structure, where mechanists assume self-assembly.

Form as a non-conserved quantity

Sheldrake argues that form is not a vector or scalar and is not conserved: flowers burned to ashes lose form while matter and energy are conserved. He notes that "even the most advanced topological methods are not yet sufficiently developed to be capable of providing a mathematical formula for, say, a giraffe or an oak tree." He also argues that Information Theory is not relevant to biological morphogenesis because developing organisms are not closed systems and complexity of form increases during development.

Distinction from Aristotle

Chapter 3 note 22 of the book explicitly distinguishes formative causation from Aristotle's formal cause, noting the hypothesis "differs radically from Aristotle's theory, which presupposed eternally given forms."

Relationship to the other terms

• morphic-fields — the proposed organizing fields.
• Morphic Resonance — the proposed non-energetic mechanism by which past similar systems influence present ones.

Limitations

The source states the claim qualitatively. It offers no formal model, no quantitative prediction, and no specified physical carrier. The evidence associated with the claim is weak-to-contested, and the source supplies no independent replication. See comparison-morphic-resonance-claims-vs-evidence.

Related pages

Morphic Resonance, morphic-fields, morphogenetic-field, mechanistic-theory-of-life, vitalism, entelechy, Rupert Sheldrake.